Africa in World Politics

The argument in Nunn’s article is that Africa has fallen from a society in a high production equilibrium to one of a low production equilibrium because of external interference.  In other words, before European contact, many African states and were strong economic producers, but the European external extraction caused African societies to adopt more unproductive economic activities (unproductive activities are defined as activities that do not create value).  Nunn describes two periods of “external extraction,” first the slave trade, and second colonialism.  During each of these time periods, the circumstances of Western interference led to economic changes that hindered development and growth.  For instance, in addition to net losses resources and labor (during the slave trade), the West used native Africans to perform jobs such as slave catchers, while others unilaterally elected to become bandits, thieves, and protestors.  Although the individual Africans involved in these aforementioned activities prospered as individuals, on the whole these acts do not produce economic value in society; they take away from it, and that is a possible explanation for Africa’s “backwardness” in modern times.

The two periods of “external extraction,” both involve greater powers dominating the continent through economic means, and in neocolonialism, through military control.  Given the argument that many trade practices in Africa at the present are a form of neo-colonialsism, would Nunn say that this is another period of outside contact, or is it Africa being stuck in the unproductive equilibrium?  I would lean towards the latter option, because even though much of “neo-colonialism” involves economic domination of Africa and a fair amount of resource extraction, the reason this is happening today is because Africa on the whole has not been able to overcome the obstacles it has faced since the slave trade and colonialism.  The fact that it is underdeveloped is likely at least somewhat due to economic behavior that is non-valuable to states on the whole.

In the reading assigned from A Profile of Africa Since Independence, Paul Nugent examines the state of newly independent Africa nations after the departure of the colonial powers. Nugent also seeks to confront the notion that some states may be predisposed to slow development (65). Nugent stresses the lack of homogeneity between African ex-colonial states. Geographic size, shape, population density, and natural resources, were all determining factors in states’ development. Nugent compares the theories of Jeffrey Herbst and Ieuan Griffiths in this chapter. Griffiths’ model highlights the size of the African nation, and their consequent resource endowment, as a crucial factor in determining the nation’s developmental prospects (66). Herbst disagrees, seeing population density and the ability for the nation’s leaders to broadcast power as essential (67). While both academics propose intriguing arguments, the extent to which their positions are tenable is inconclusive.

What is interesting about this chapter is the difficulty that the discussed authors faced in constructing more impermeable theories. Determinations of size and shape do not suffice in analyzing a country’s capabilities, as resources, and access to oceans both had substantial effects on nations’ development. In a larger sense, it seems that Africa as a continent has the paradoxical fate of being frequently referred to in broad strokes by popular media, while in reality being a brazenly inconsistent and idiosyncratic continent. One aspect of the reading that drew my attention was how frequently the African nations described in the post seemed to rely on one, or a few, commodities and resources to maintain their economy. Ghana is dependent on cocoa, Zambia relies on copper, and oil and diamonds define several countries (70). Perhaps, the economic fragility that these states faced was related less to size, shape, or geographic region, conditions that all seem to have notable outliers, but more to the make up of the countries’ economies and the manner in which the nations’ provided for themselves.

In Chapter 13 of Understanding Contemporary Africa, Gordon discusses the prospects of Africa’s future and provides updates on certain goals for the country such as poverty reduction, debt relief, trade and investment, aid, and information technology (398). Most of these goals have not been met and some are even moving in the opposite direction, hurting Africa even more. Additional factors such as resource extraction, increasing poverty, and ineffective aid threaten to trap Africa in a vicious cycle of dependency and helplessness. Gordon advocates that Africa build a more diversified economy, mix public and private investment, and prepare production for local and regional consumption so that Africa can be prosperous and stabilize its economy (407).

One particular aspect of Gordon’s argument that I found extremely compelling was his comment on Africa’s “brain drain”, signifying the tens of thousands of intellectual Africans who are lured by higher wages and chances of success to leave the continent and relocate to places such as the United States and Australia (413). I thought that this was a very important yet often overlooked point. If those that are most capable of great leadership and innovation leave Africa, then the continent is left with uneducated and power-hungry individuals who end up establishing corrupt regimes that leave millions in poverty. However, if African intellectuals were given incentives to stay on the continent and help build businesses or innovation there, then they could boost the economy and ultimately the standard of living as well in Africa. For example, instead of having foreigners come in to help build new projects or infrastructure, intellectuals should be in charge, helping build stronger ties between Africans while also relying less on foreign aid and intervention. It seems that debt-giving countries should consider this while they think of ways to help Africa rise from the bottom.

In 2010, the McKinsey Global Institute produced a report entitled “Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies.” The report argued that Africa’s recent growth has been in part a product of increasing regional stability, “macroeconomic reforms, and microeconomic stability” and states that in the consumer goods sector, Africa holds the potential for $2.6 trillion dollars in annual revenue. [i] The telecommunications sector is one part of the consumer goods sector that holds a large potential for revenue gains. If states such as Kenya practice regulatory reform and infrastructure development the country would be ripe for development in the telecommunications industry. The combined efforts of government and private telecommunications corporations would grant expanded communication abilities for citizens while opening up a new market for private industry.

I argue that McKinsey has gotten it exactly right. Cooperation between the public and private sector can make Africa a place ripe for development and business. Too long have western corporations, often with local politicians in their pockets, exploited African resources undermining the countries development in order to make a quick buck. Similarly, state run enterprises have often failed becoming inefficient and plagued by corruption. Instead of state run enterprises attempting to build infrastructure or take the sole burden of stimulating development or private corporations leeching African resources, a partnership between public and private sector business can lead to a strong development climate. While this kind of cooperation is ideal, there are significant issues surrounding it. How can anyone ensure public officials are acting in their countries best interests not merely their own? Similarly, how can a corporation be restricted so they do not profit through exploitation? The cooperation between public and private enterprise can be extremely beneficial to development but the efforts of both parties to enhance the public good through development and responsible business must be genuine.

Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa is a crucial read for anyone striving to understand the nature of foreign aid in Africa – how it is given, how it is received, and how it should be improved. Moyo’s central argument is that African countries “flounder in a seemingly never-ending cycle of corruption, disease, poverty and aid-dependency” and remain impoverished and struggling precisely because of the foreign aid they are given. I disagree with the notion that this relationship between cause and effect is so cut and dry, and refute the idea that African countries are struggling because and only because of the foreign aid dilemma. I also disagree that foreign aid is “the disease of which it pretends to be the cure,” or, restated, that the giving of foreign aid is malevolent and intentionally masquerades as something it is not. I argue that, though foreign aid does come from a place of good intentions and other factors have played a great role in keeping Africa impoverished and underdeveloped, foreign aid definitely does – as Moyo argues – contribute greatly to the problem.

Aid has in fact made the poor poorer and growth much slower. Why? I agree with Moyo that the cycle of foreign aid is analogous to a resource curse, in that the presence of resources – like the acceptance of aid – “encourages corruption and conflict, while at the same time discouraging free enterprise.” Mobutu Sese Seko is a perfect example. As Moyo describes, though he was funneled a tremendous amount of aid, he reportedly stole $5 billion of that aid.

When it comes down to it, the crucial distinction between my argument and Moyo’s is that, while she believes Western aid-giving institutions almost willingly ignore what is happening with the foreign aid they dispense, I believe they are genuinely trying to help and are merely oblivious to the effects of their aid-giving. However, it is highly problematic that they have failed to stop and examine African politics with a critical eye. If they had, they would recognize patterns that remain consistent throughout the continent (for instance, an economy of affection and practices of patronage and neo-patrimonialism), and that each country also needs to be analyzed individually. It should have been noted, for example, that the DRC was ruled by a greedy dictator, and that aid to him would soon leave the continent altogether, rather than go towards improving conditions in the nation.

I also agree with some of Moyo’s suggested solutions. She encourages policymakers to learn from Asia, to make direct investments and allow exports to flow in order to boost economic development. She also claims elections are useless without economic growth that precedes them. I agree that economic growth is a priority in alleviating the issues occurring in African nations. Finally, I agree that the discourse surrounding Africa’s dilemmas should not be dominated by non-African white men, as it currently is. If these problems are to be improved upon, more voices like Moyo’s must be heard.

Salah Hassan’s article, “Darfur and the Crisis of Governance in Sudan: A Left Perspective”, is extremely critical of the Save Darfur movement and its role in the crisis. Hassan accuses the movement of doing more harm than good and seems to question the very existence of such a movement. Hassan’s article is does not seem to criticize just Save Darfur, but interest and advocacy of  citizens in conflicts not directly connected to their country. While he fails to give straightforward suggestions for the role of foreign individuals in African conflicts, he implicitly suggests that the proper course of action is to mind one’s own business and let the Sudanese and Sudanese diaspora find a solution. In this way his article suggests that the international community should return to a model where sovereignty trumps all.

For example, he supports Mamdani’s assertion that Americans should be concerned with the crisis that they created in Iraq instead of Darfur. Overall, Hassan’s article is accusatory and seems to believe, not only that Save Darfur is misguided, but also that there is something wrong with non-Sudanese interest and advocacy in the conflict (102). Even though, he briefly admits that many in the movement are legitimately interested in the well being of those in Darfur, he does not seem to think that this is positive or in any way a good thing.

In addition, although he frequently condemns the Sudanese government he repeatedly compares the Darfur crisis to others, such as a Iraq and points out that there are not as many deaths in Sudan. In this case it almost seems as if he toning down the severity of the crisis (106).

One future and recent development that Botswana is engaging in is gay rights in the larger context of international human rights. A month ago, former President Festus Mogae publicly defended gay rights in light of the HIV epidemic in Botswana. He believes that confronting societal concerns about gay rights and sex workers is a necessary step in stemming the spread of HIV and developing more effective public health programs. Although this appears to be an internal issue, a few days ago U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivered a Human Right’s Day speech about LGBT concerns and mentioned Botswana’s former President’s words.

What is significant about this connection is that Clinton mentioned that the “Obama Administration defends the human rights of LGBT people as part of our comprehensive human rights policy and as a priority of our foreign policy.” (Clinton 2011) Most U.S. and Botswana relations surrounding issues of HIV/AIDs and tuberculosis involved research, treatment and funding. Linking LGBT rights and human rights into the picture brings a legal and justice dimension to this foreign relation. For Botswana, this issue elevates its domestic battle against HIV/AIDs into the international human rights sphere. Although it was the former president who made the public announcement, he still can speak and represent his country. Human rights could potentially be a new point of connection between U.S. and Botswana and perhaps, even U.S. and Africa.

The future trajectory for Botswana would be to continue expanding its economy and influence in southern Africa and the continent. The Botswana government seems conscious of its dependency on diamonds and is making economic diversification its foremost priority. Their program policy for the upcoming years also targets improving tertiary education and research and technology. These goals are important for the long-term economic development of the country and for curbing the unemployment rate. Another source of emerging income has been through tourism and environmental tourism, which requires development in various sectors such as technology, hospitality, administration and environmentalism.

In light of Africa’s movement towards democratization, Botswana has experienced a stable democratic government for the past few decades and can be a key player in emerging democracies in African countries. In terms of regional concerns, it will be interesting to see how Botswana responds to Zimbabwe and how talks and cooperative or non-cooperative efforts between Botswana and South Africa will affect regional policies. (CIA Factbook) Its involvement in the Southern African Development Community will not only impact its regional economic participation but also its military engagement for peacekeeping interventions in Africa. (BBC News)

The future of Botswana is extremely bright and many times the international limelight has fallen on South Africa as a leader for Africa but I think Botswana’s political stability and economic growth is also a venerable model for Africa to consider.